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Abstract 
  David Benatar has presented and defended a powerful argument for adopting an anti-natalist stance, 
avoiding procreation, and embracing the extinction of humanity. His is work that deserves to be 
taken seriously and responded to with caution and care. In the below we will attempt such an 
undertaking, focusing on two aspects of Benatar’s thought in particular: asymmetry and suffering. 
Although we will find weaknesses in Benatar’s analyses on asymmetry and suffering, we will not 
thereby seek to reject the anti-natalist conclusions that Benatar draws from them, yet nor will we 
conversely seek to accept them. Instead we will leave the issue open and move into some parallel 
thoughts on the topic of coping, on the “Now what?” and the “…and so…” that each of us who find 
ourselves alive inevitably face. In the hard light of life as we come to know it, what are any of us to 
do? 
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1. Being been 
 
Here we are. You find yourself reading this, I find myself writing it, and yet 
neither of us might have wished to meet this moment, to meet at this moment, 
had our prenatal selves been given and capable of the choice. You did not ask to 
be born but you were, likewise I had no say in the matter; still there you sit, or 
stand, as do I. We are, there is no denying that, and we will remain for at least a 
little longer. Is there any fairness in this situation? Did our parents consider us, 
our lives, our futures, our possibilities and potentialities, prior to conception? If 
so, why did they conclude to create us? If not, why not? We who are should like 
to know, and although it is a set of questions that can be easily asked I doubt that 
many would be able to answer. 
This is David Benatar’s challenge, and he makes it with a forcefulness and 
resourcefulness that demands a deeper examination than he has perhaps often 
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received from his many naysayers. While the arguments he makes might have 
deep roots – one could handily argue that asymmetry stretches all the way back 
to the Buddha, or even further into earlier strands of subcontinental philosophy – 
Benatar, in his seminal Better Never to Have Been,1 makes a series of steps that 
are nevertheless fresh, original, and provocative. In the below we will concern 
ourselves primarily with two aspects of his work, stretching them and replying 
to replies that he has made to others who have raised similar concerns in an 
effort to give the attention due to this most central of questions: Is my life 
worthwhile? We will frame our examination in those terms, and with that 
personal perspective, despite Benatar’s own anti-natal focus because I would 
like to present a case for coping rather than one regarding procreational choices. 
The issues involved are of course related, so intimately intertwined in fact that 
we shall have to think about each, but in my view there is nevertheless room for 
an investigatory spotlight to be swung onto one more so than the other. At least, 
that is what I hope to make some progress towards; we will have to see how the 
proceeding develops. 
We who live, what are we to do? Part of that is a response to whether we 
ought to bring more life into existence and thereby share our limited time, but to 
my mind that is a query quite apart from the one that asks “Now what?” To have 
a child or not to have a child can be rationally analyzed and a settlement – 
however tentative – in the positive or negative made, yet when that same 
rationality turns inward and one’s own life is seen starkly naked in the mind’s 
eye the quandaries that present themselves are more opaque and, I think, that 
much more strenuous. This is likely due to their inextricability from the cobwebs 
of the self: one cannot really get a proper look, there is no emotional distance to 
be had, and any claims of objectivity on the matter must be recognized for the 
chicanery they boil down to. Albert Camus’ famous sole serious philosophical 
problem – that of suicide2 – can never be definitively answered because it must 
be faced by each creature with the awareness and cognitive ability to address it. 
That so many of us run from that question our lives long does not reduce its 
immediacy nor its potency. We did not ask to be but yet we are – again, “Now 
what?” 
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The two aspects of Benatar’s fine argumentation that we will address on our 
way to “Now what?” are the titular two listed: asymmetry and suffering. I think 
that weaknesses can be found in each of the cases he presents, but I do not think 
that such are sufficient to necessarily negate his conclusions. I think too that 
there are buried nuances in Benatar’s work that are often overlooked but that 
bear relevance and importance concerning those conclusions. These opening 
sections will therefore provide the needed background – and a set of tools – with 
which to then make an attempt at some thoughts regarding coping, regarding 
“…and so…” 
Here we are. You, me, everyone we know and everyone we have yet to know. 
People and potential people, the existent and the not-yet, the maybe-never. We 
may finally wish to embrace an anti-natalist position or we may not; in either 
case we will have to respond to the deeper dilemma of self, of being, of waking 
up and having to face one’s own terrifying ability to wonder why. We will have 
to say something to that mirror. 
 
2. Better Never 1: Asymmetry 
 
Benatar primarily bases his anti-natalist arguments in the case he builds for 
determining that existence is always a harm, and the harm, he asserts, stems 
from a basic asymmetry between being and non-being. He goes about this 
through exploring a Cartesian grid-like relationship between poles of pleasure 
and pain on one axis and existence and non-existence on the other. Starting from 
the assumption that all lives will contain some pleasure and some pain, Benatar 
compares the presence of pleasure and pain in the (sentient) existent with the 
absence of both in the non-existent. Pain for the existent is “bad” while the 
absence of pain for the non-existent is “good”; pleasure for the existent is also 
“good”, but its absence for the non-existent is “not bad” rather than “bad” – at 
this point of disjuncture the claimed asymmetry in the relationship is established, 
and the remainder springs from there.3 The reasoning behind the “not bad” 
labeling of this absence is that Benatar does not understand there to be any 
deprivation involved when pleasure is missing for the non-existent. This stance 
is connected with Benatar’s anti-procreation view in that for him only the 
causing of life “can be regretted for the sake of the person whose existence was 
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contingent on our decision” and that although we may feel regret that an existent 
person (even a stranger) lacks a particular good, we cannot do so for a 
never-existent person; if we do then such is actually a feeling for ourselves and 
not the non-existent (e.g. grief over not having a child).4 Further on in his 
analysis Benatar extends this thought, stating that absent pleasures which 
deprive (those for the existent) are “‘bad’ in the sense of ‘worse’”, but that those 
that do not deprive (for the non-existent) are “‘not bad’ in the sense of ‘not 
worse’” – and that “not worse”, again by way of comparison, as “not worse than 
the presence of pleasures” for the existent.5 In his argument all of the preceding 
is grounded in judgments made “with reference to the (potential) interests of a 
person who either does or does not exist”,6 or, in other words (in our words), 
the (potential) interests of potential people. In considering this line of reasoning 
it will be important to keep this perspective in mind, and we must note here at 
the outset the key words “with reference to”, meaning that this is necessarily a 
point of view taken from the outside, and the implication therefore being a 
presumed objectivity, a position from which one may ‘properly’ comment on 
others. When seen from such a third person perspective, what are the interests of 
this existent or non-existent person? 
Therein lies the rub. From my own vantage, on my first person 
understanding, if I look at a non-existent person as not having a pleasure and 
then at an existent person as having a pleasure, and then at a non-existent person 
avoiding a pain that the existent person suffers, I do see deprivation, and that of 
both the pleasure and the pain. I may, from my role as outsider, consider the 
tradeoff in question one worth making (e.g. giving up the pleasure in order to 
miss the pain) and thus not consider it a ‘harm’ for the person, but what troubles 
me is that I cannot agree with an evaluation of this sort being taken at face value 
in the way that Benatar seems to do since the viewpoint involved is not the 
viewpoint of the (potential) person himself.7 We are, again, looking at this “with 
reference to”, and thus taking what appears logical enough as we sit (or stand) 
here comfortably as being the final word on the matter. This extension is 
somewhat disingenuous, I think, for if we are really to pursue the (potential) 
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interests of (potential) people we must do so from the inside, from their own 
perspectives, and not from ours. We might try to claim an objectivity in our 
evaluation given that we are an ‘outsider’ to the query being made, but whatever 
pretentions we may have we are nevertheless speaking from out of our own 
heads, with our own background biases and prejudices intact. This is important 
to realize.8 
If we do try for a shift of perspective into that of the affected potential 
person and his interests, what do we find? Who knows! I cannot possibly answer 
for him, nor for you, nor you for him nor for me; but I can answer for me and 
you for you, and if we then further flip the equation to make room for Benatar’s 
“not worse” (for non-depriving absent pleasures with regard to the non-existent, 
as above) we are led to conclude that such are in fact “bad” rather than “not 
worse”. At least, I am led to conclude that, and I am so because if I imagine my 
own potential interests I think that I want that pleasure and that not having it is 
simply “bad”. If I then compare it (its absence) with pain (a present pain) do I 
want the pleasure enough to also take the pain to get it? If I do then its absence 
is “bad”, if I do not then I may agree with Benatar that its absence is “not worse”. 
Do I though agree? Do you? It appears very difficult to draw any universals here 
if we are serious about taking a first person perspective on the matter. I might, or 
I might have to first weigh the pain against the pleasure, or I might wish to know 
how much and how long for each, of what type, or any manner of additional 
information, but I will still have to decide for myself, and that on each occasion. 
Yet here we hit another wall: If I am a non-existent potential person (taking his 
perspective) then how can I decide anything? 
This touches on some thoughts Masahiro Morioka presents regarding his 
“the heart of meaning in life”, a concept that stresses the inapplicability of any 
judgment of this sort outside of one’s own life.9 One’s own life as lived in that 
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tradition its modern force probably takes its root from the widespread influence of Friedrich Nietzsche, 
particularly his Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. and comm. by 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House Inc., 1966). 
9 Masahiro Morioka, “Is Meaning in Life Comparable?: From the Viewpoint of ‘The Heart of 
Meaning in Life’”, Journal of Philosophy of Life 5:3 (2015), 50-65. 
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moment, we could add, for surely such changes widely during the ebb and flow 
of not only conditions and contexts but moods and feelings as well. 10 
Perspective seems – is – paramount. In that importance we come to appreciate 
that while it is already very difficult to maintain a proper focus when making 
comparisons of this nature the problems compound when we attempt the internal 
outlook of the potential interests of a potential person, because then in seeking a 
glimpse of how we might ascertain deprivation or non-deprivation regarding 
pleasure and/or pain we immediately find ourselves stuck in existence, mired in 
the already existent, cutting out both of our adjectival “potentials”. Nothing at 
all (from the inside) can really be said about the non-existent for the very basic 
reason that he does not exist to choose between the options; yet we do 
nevertheless recognize that – and again this is the real crux of the matter – 
something can still be said for the non-existent: but it can only be said from the 
outside, from our own (relevant?) assumptions about what he may decide. 
The speculation involved in the process we have been investigating should 
be clear enough, and in that clarity hang all the doubts swirling around the 
veracity and trustworthiness of such claims when made for another about 
intensely personal perceptions like “good”, “bad”, “worse”, “not worse”, and 
even what is and what is not thought of as “deprivation” and “harm”. How could 
these labels just be taken over from me to you? From out of my experience to 
yours? From my actual interests to your potential interests? If you do not exist 
then what can I say other than that your pleasure and its lack are equally empty, 
and if I then try to guess at what your potential interests might be I will likely 
determine an absent pleasure to be “bad” and/or “worse” rather than “not worse”, 
unless perhaps I happen to have an unusually strong aversion to pain when 
approached in the abstracted way it is elongated to be in such a general 
comparison.11 To really consider the potential interests of potential people we 
must seek to do so from the inside, and if we do we quickly discover that we are 
only able to do so for the existent, breaking down the analogy sought and 
leaving us with the bare pleasure = good, pain = bad, absent pleasure = bad 
(worse), absent pain = good (better). 
                                                     
10 We will return to a deeper exploration of Morioka’s work in the following for it has much to 
contribute to our thoughts on these matters. 
11 Benatar, for his part, argues that even pricking one’s finger on a pin once is enough to justify the 
conclusions he has made regarding the desirability of pain avoidance, but I am not sure how many of 
us would concur with that intuition. Even if we do, however, I think that my line here concerning what 
happens when we take a first person perspective nevertheless stands; see Benatar 2006, op. cit. 
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Benatar has a response to the above. In a reply to his critics written some 
seven years after his book was published he emphasizes that his objective is in 
investigating “whether coming into existence is in the interests of the person 
who comes into existence or whether it would have been better for that person if 
he had never been.”12 Critiques along the lines of mine above (Benatar quotes 
from David DeGrazia, who arrived at similar conclusions13) are said to be 
confused in reasoning that only subjects might have interests, and with the 
non-existent there is no subject and hence no interests. Benatar’s reply is that 
what are being compared here are two possible worlds: one with the subject in 
question, and one without. He writes: 
 
One way in which we can judge which of these possible worlds is better, 
is with reference to the interests of the person who exists in one (and 
only one) of these two possible worlds. Obviously those interests only 
exist in the possible world in which the person exists, but this does not 
preclude our making judgments about the value of an alternative possible 
world, and doing so with reference to the interests of the person in the 
possible world in which he does exist.14 
 
This is a good point and a strong counterargument to the subject/missing subject 
objection, yet what is missed here is the important stress that we and not many 
other commentators have placed on the perspective involved. Benatar’s 
justification for comparing possible worlds still takes as its focus the same “with 
reference to”, that is, a look from the outside, a purportedly objective point of 
view in which the so-called rationality of the suppositions arrived at are 
presumably grounded. Our concerns for the inside have therefore not been met, 
and when we return to them, when we again try for a first person based 
determination, we find the same impossibility of exposition and non-cross 
applicability that were earlier stressed.15 I cannot work into the head of a 
                                                     
12 David Benatar, “Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics”, The Journal of 
Ethics 17:1/2 (2013), 121-151, p. 125. 
13 The referenced piece is David DeGrazia, “Is It Wrong to Impose the Harms of Human Life? A 
Reply to Benatar”, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (2010), 317-331. 
14 Benatar 2013, op. cit., p. 125. 
15 Similarly Morioka also argues that to really compare two possible worlds one must be able to 
imagine both and one cannot imagine a world in which one does not exist; this is not a direct reply to 
Benatar since, as we indicated, his is a view from the outside and therefore does not necessitate 
imagining a world in which one oneself does not exist, but it is a good point and Morioka’s thought is 
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non-existent potential person to find his potential interests, and what I may 
rightly claim are my own justified interests as pertaining to pleasure and pain 
and the derivative judgments I thereby draw do not seem to be the kind of 
evaluations that can be directly pasted onto another. We are still at our impasse, 
and in that, I think, we have enough of a reason to be wary of asymmetry. I 
would like to stress that even so this does not remark on, nor is it meant to 
remark on, Benatar’s anti-natalist position as it pertains to the question of 
procreation. Ours is instead about the “Now what?”, the “…and so…”, and we 
will continue in that focus in the next section on suffering. 
 
3. Better Never 2: Suffering 
 
Benatar’s secondary argument in his masterful work demonstrates how the 
same conclusions outlined above can be arrived at through the fact and 
inevitability of suffering. Given these two aspects (that suffering is real and that 
all persons will suffer), he extends his case for the preference of not only 
non-existence but never-existence, “better never to have been”. Towards this end 
a long list of statistics on death from natural disasters, hunger and malnutrition, 
disease, governmental and private murder and the like are presented, and it is 
further noted that in addition to the deaths themselves there are many others who 
are bereaved at the losses and therefrom yet more suffering is born. So much for 
death, but as we who live know only too well suffering does not end there: 
additional mention is made of rape, assault, cultural practices like female 
circumcision, slavery, betrayal, humiliation, oppression, 16  and since we 
recognize there is no finality to this Benatar’s point is very well evident. We all 
suffer – every conscious creature does; there can be no question of that. Moving 
from this step to the desirability of never being in the first place though is a 
rather large leap if we notice that within this argumentation there is a crucial 
gloss being made. 
In the statistics and the listing that he gives, Benatar is essentially taking 
parts for the whole: he is equating instances of suffering with suffering tout 
court: he is inferring life as suffering from instances of suffering during life. He 
does not do this explicitly, and his position seems to be that any suffering, large 
or small, that happens in a life is enough for never having been to be better for 
                                                                                                                                                                     
worth taking into account here. See Morioka, op. cit. 
16 Benatar 2006, op. cit. 
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the sufferer, but the structural implication that life simply equals suffering is 
hard to miss, especially given the realities of the world with which we are 
familiar. I do not find such a far-reaching evaluation to be justified here, even if 
it is only a derivative one. This is not to deny suffering, and it is certainly not 
intended as a downplaying of suffering, rather it is only to point out that a 
person’s (even a potential person’s) life might be internally thought of as pretty 
good – maybe even fully good – despite occasional, often, or frequent sufferings. 
If so, we might think, then the suffering experienced does not lead to “better 
never to have been”, or at least not directly. Jonathan Haidt writes that during a 
course of research on a group of Indian prostitutes living in desperate poverty 
and pain he was taken aback at how happy many of them reported being.17 If we 
are thinking of their interests, and trying to do so from within their own 
perspectives, we ought to take such self-appraisals into account. Doing so does 
not of course mean that we cannot think their conditions should be improved, 
that they might not be even happier in another line of work, in another home 
situation, or in generally altered circumstances in many or all respects, but it 
does (or should) give pause to taking “suffering now” to be “suffering full stop”. 
I am not sure whether Benatar himself would concur that life is suffering full 
stop, or whether he only wishes to say that some suffering is sufficient to 
outweigh the positives of existence, but in either case the manner of typical 
personal evaluating is surely relevant, and in that it does, I think, signal caution 
about making such a widespread judgment. 
Benatar anticipates an objection along the lines of this one as well. He 
outlines three psychological traits that usually cause people to understand their 
lives to be more positive than they might be assessed as if seen from another 
perspective (i.e. an ‘objective’ point of view; Benatar discusses hedonistic, 
desire fulfillment, and objective list theories in conjunction). The three traits are: 
Pollyannaism, adaptation to circumstances and the subsequent adjustment of 
expectations, and comparison of oneself with others around one.18 This opens 
the way to a person quite simply being wrong about their own suffering, and if 
one can be so mistaken then, Benatar argues in a later work, evaluations of life 
satisfaction can be erroneous too.19 Moreover, whatever we may say about our 
                                                     
17 Jonathan Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis: Finding Modern Truth in Ancient Wisdom (New York: 
Basic Books, 2006). 
18 Benatar 2006, op. cit. 
19 Benatar 2013, op. cit. 
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suffering or our lives now, Benatar adds that “the worst part of many people’s 
lives is often at the end, those who think that they are satisfied with their whole 
lives [overall satisfaction] may not have faced the most trying test of that 
judgment until close to their death.”20 
Again, Benatar’s rebuttal is excellent and well worth the effort a thoughtful 
response requires; yet a response, in my estimation, can still be made, and ours 
will center once more on concerns of the first person perspective and the related 
factor of self-deception. For one, the psychological evidence for optimism is not 
as straightforward as it might at first seem. There is actually strong contrary 
biological and evolutionary evidence suggesting that our brains are hardwired 
not for optimism but for pessimism, for concentrating on real and possible 
dangers and not on the positives already in hand.21 It could therefore, I cheekily 
suggest, be that anti-natalist outcomes are the results of intuitively negative 
biased thinking rather than conclusions won through rigorous and objective 
analyses. That said, given the natural drive for procreation that all species have I 
rather doubt such to be the case, but raising it as a possibility is intriguing (and – 
I admit – deliciously fun as an unexpected twist to all this). Whatever the brain 
chemistry involved might or might not be, I think there is regardless a case to be 
made for the benefits of perspective, and too for the possible self-deception 
referred to, and it is in that direction where I would now like to turn our 
attention. 
Returning to Morioka’s “the heart of meaning in life” and stretching the 
concept out somewhat, we find that its focus on legitimacy purely for and about 
the holder in question – and thus total non-applicability beyond the self – leads 
us to think that what is far more paramount than the determinations of an 
externally conducted ‘life goodness trial’ such as we might get from the 
supposedly objective theories Benatar mentions22 is what one makes of one’s 
own being as one lives it out day by day. As a precaution (and caveat), I should 
indicate that by this I do not mean to argue that self-evaluations are necessarily 
infallible, rather simply that they are valuable, very valuable, and in that value 
creating. Morioka and Camus seem to agree, the former writing that “although 
the value and goodness of one’s life cannot be determined only by one’s inner 
                                                     
20 ibid., p. 142. 
21 For a general reader oriented introduction to the science involved that doubles as a self-help book 
see Rick Hanson, Hardwiring Happiness: The New Brain Science of Contentment, Calm, and 
Confidence (New York: Harmony Books, 2013). 
22 The three again are: hedonistic, desire fulfillment, and objective list. 
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judgment, with regard to ‘the heart of meaning in life,’ it ought to be determined 
in a purely internalist fashion”,23 and the latter that “Being aware of one’s life, 
one’s revolt, one’s freedom, and to the maximum, is living, and to the maximum. 
Where lucidity dominates, the scale of values becomes useless.”24 For both 
thinkers, and for us, value assigned comes primarily from within, and in that the 
perspective that one has, that one embraces (hopefully reflectively though not 
necessarily so) for one’s own self will be determinative of the judgments one 
comes to on one’s existence – and, perhaps, on existence itself.25 To an extent 
Benatar is with us here too, stating that “I agree that one’s own assessments can 
have some impact on the quality of one’s life, and they can influence how 
bearable one’s life is, but they do not preclude radical error.”26 I appreciate this, 
but would nevertheless say both yes and no to Benatar’s thought as expressed 
because I think the term “radical error” calls for a slight expansion, a brief 
(sideline) discussion. 
To begin with, where is the “error” in “radical error”? It could only be one 
ascertained from the same outside perspective Benatar has been promoting,27 
from the same claims to objectivity, but in the kinds of value judgments that we 
are examining what might be the source for such other than shared intuitions? 
There can hardly be a data based evaluation made here along the lines of Person 
X’s twelve excellent years outweigh the forty mediocre years and two bad ones 
due to Y considerations. What variables might be in play in such an analysis and 
how might they be measured? If my life’s valuation is internally based, as has 
been argued, then however incorrect you take my determination of quality to be 
I would yet be able to simply disagree with you. After all, we are talking about 
how I understand my life to be, and even your application of an objective list 
                                                     
23 Morioka, op. cit., p. 59. 
24 Camus, op. cit., pp. 60-61. 
25 I have argued elsewhere for the benefits of moving away from the typical insistence (in analytical 
philosophy, but also in mainstream society) on objectivity, and on what I take to be the impossibilities 
within such demands; see Andrew Oberg, “Thinking Unempirically”, Philosopher, 03 July 2017. 
<http://philosopher.io/Thinking-Unempirically>. Accessed 27 September 2018. 
26 Benatar 2013, op. cit., p. 146. 
27 One could, I suppose, say in hindsight that “I was wrong about such and such”, but the critical 
feature is the necessity of self-application, that one does not consider oneself in error until one later 
accepts that term vis-à-vis the assessment in question. Why might one do such? It could be the result 
of additional information, or an altered vantage point, or any number of reasons, but for the person 
involved it would not be an “error” at the time, only possibly afterwards on further reflection. It 
therefore follows that in the usage employed in Benatar’s quoted sentence – regarding a current 
assessment of one’s quality of life – what is being considered is an outside judgment, and that is where 
we take issue. 
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theory to the contours of my being could only have the impact that I allow it to 
have, there is no final court of arbitration involved, no third party on a throne 
that could overrule the view from behind my own eyes. You could try and 
convince me that I am wrong, that I am in “radical error” about just how good 
(or bad) my life is, but the resultant decision remains mine to make. It could be 
argued that one or the other is the more rational choice, but again, where is the 
rationality so appealed to grounded? Any insistence on any superiority of this or 
that could be refuted by the subject since it is the subject’s own personal take on 
his own life, and if he will not admit to an error – radical or not, rational or not – 
how could such be forced upon him? 
The example Benatar gives regarding a list of species based objective goods 
out of which this type of “radical error” might appear itself betrays the same 
foundation in nothing more than an ostensibly shared intuitive judgment: he 
writes that “living for a few 100 years in the full vigour of youth, without any ill 
health would surely be good.”28 I, for one, do not share this sentiment, and if I 
do not then it is possible that there are others who do not as well. My reasoning 
for not agreeing here, such as it is, is that I have zero desire to live for a few 
hundred years or even for one hundred years, despite being granted the prospect 
of it being spent in vigor and health. Such strikes me, from my own inner 
valuation and perspective, as an outrageously long time to spend on the planet; I 
have enough trouble wrestling with awareness as it is. Considering his novel 
Galápagos I think that Kurt Vonnegut at least would agree;29 that now makes 
two of us. Does this dissent add to or subtract from the ‘objectivity’ in our list of 
objective goods? We need not belabor the point any longer: judgments of this 
sort must be from within, and in that non-cross referential, and if yours are 
thought by me to be self-deceiving then that opinion really amounts to very little 
– only as much as you permit it to. Furthermore, given the fact of suffering, such 
self-deception might be very welcome, and if we can adopt an optimistic 
outlook as well it might provide too a goal to work towards, a challenge for us to 
live better. 
It will be noted again that none of this really has to do with anti-natalism, 
with the deep and serious question of whether or not to have children. My 
failure to address that issue is an admission I am more than willing to make, and 
                                                     
28 Benatar 2013, op. cit., p. 146. 
29 Or rather would have agreed, Vonnegut passed away in 2007; Kurt Vonnegut, Galápagos (New 
York: Delacorte Press, 1985). 
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I can only here remind the reader that ours is an examination of coping, of once 
alive, of “Now what?”, and though all of the above is enlaced with procreation it 
is not about procreation itself. That, sadly, is beyond our scope, and probably 
beyond my ability as a philosopher. In our final main section, however, we will 
have some things to say that may be applicable to anti-natalist/natalist interests, 
although we will yet maintain our voice of address to our chosen “…and so…” 
 
4. Beside Better Never: Some thoughts on coping 
 
Due to the structure and reach of Benatar’s argumentative thrust on the 
topics of asymmetry and suffering, and to the conclusions which he draws from 
them, I think it is easy to overlook that his is really – as we have acknowledged 
in our demurring on the subject – a concern about not creating any more 
children, additional creatures who would thus have to deal with life. Life as it is. 
Moreover, when considering how many critics have reacted to Benatar’s work, it 
seems to me that for most the fact of his being a moral concern is completely 
lost. His arguments are aimed at the morality of procreation, or rather at the 
immorality of sentient life creation and the morality of its avoidance. This 
appears to grow from a deep compassion that Benatar evidently feels for all we 
who can feel: human animals and non-human animals. This is very laudable. 
Yet in this, and in order to make the case for these conclusions, Benatar 
must comment on life per se, and he must establish that regardless of 
circumstances and contexts it is sufficiently undesirable that it should not be 
carried through from generation to generation via the continuation of the species. 
He wishes for there to be an end to the madness, and sentience – well, that is 
madness. We can see this judgment in his call for the complete disappearance of 
all humanity, and the sooner the better.30 What is really interesting in this, in my 
view, is that while Benatar argues that those humans who are alive today should 
be the very last humans in history (by the fact of no one reproducing), he does 
not call for suicide. Voluntary extinction is not mass suicide; the latter would be 
an absolute act of death while the former is an absolute reception of it. 
We who are did not ask to be but yet are; now that we are the manner in 
which we consider our existence will go a long way towards influencing any 
choices we might take to have children. An assessment of life comes first, 
                                                     
30 Benatar 2006, op. cit. 
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anti-natalism or natalism second. One is wrapped around the other, the other 
around the one, and so tightly that we have, in a roundabout way, really been 
half-addressing procreation all along: though only half-addressing because, it 
should be clear, a determination that life is worth living (continuing) is not the 
same as a determination that it ought to be continued (reproducing). In his book 
Benatar covers these issues too, and he has responded in print over the years to 
critiques making such pithy calls as “Why not just kill yourself then?” in lieu of 
more thoughtful objections; I do not find fault with Benatar’s work on these 
points and in fact rather think much of it praiseworthy. We will therefore move 
on and away from Better Never to Have Been into a parallel rumination on 
suffering and life and life as suffering. Is the nature of our being truly so 
wrought with suffering to cement a commitment to cease humanity altogether? 
Benatar is convinced that it is; I am not so sure. In examining this we do not 
need to argue for the justification of suffering and pain along lines such as 
beneficial character building aspects or the making of pleasure that much the 
sweeter or the like, instead we ought to look at life as a whole in the way it is 
experienced by us to determine whether or not we subjectively accept suffering 
as just that: acceptable; in the grand scheme of things as one part of life that is 
okay as being a part of life. Do we? This is the query of coping, the “Now 
what?”, the “…and so…”, and from it, from out of it, flows all the rest. 
To begin we will first need to distinguish between pain and suffering, 
because while related the two concepts are distinct and in their phenomenology 
may or may not be inclusive of one another. On my own analysis I find pain to 
be more temporary than suffering, perhaps akin to a feeling versus a mood, and 
though bodily harm comes readily to mind I would not insist on a physical basis 
for pain. I think that both pain and suffering can be either physical or emotional 
in nature, or indeed both. In this suffering will often contain pain, and pain may 
be a trigger for suffering, but suffering does not lead to pain because it operates 
on us in – we experience it as – a more fundamental phenomenon: again, like a 
mood that undergirds a feeling. Pain comes and then goes, but it may leave a 
lasting mark in trauma, and if so then that trauma becomes a part of our 
suffering rather than (on this definition) an extension of our pain. I might suffer 
my whole life through (in one way or another, to one degree or another), but I 
am unlikely to be in pain my whole life through, and certainly not intense 
physical pain for the body has adaptive reactions to that (e.g. passing out). I 
could, possibly, be in a prolonged state of emotional pain, even intense 
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emotional pain, but such would likely slide into a condition of suffering at some 
temporal point, although when exactly that might be seems hard to delineate. 
Now all this is highly academic, somewhat dry, and in danger of becoming a 
pathetic limp away from the focus we seek on life and an ascertainment of it as 
being worthwhile enough – or not – to carry on with despite its undeniable 
incidents of both pain and suffering. In other words, are we able to sufficiently 
cope? 
These related notions have opened before us a few interesting and applicable 
conceptual avenues. On such J. David Velleman gives the following: “What 
makes the difference between pain and suffering is coping. Suffering occurs 
when someone cannot or does not cope with adversity of some kind.”31 
Velleman’s definition seems to imply that suffering is a failure, a shortcoming in 
“just dealing with it”, as it were, and this nuance is reinforced by him shortly 
thereafter when he states that “Coping is therefore a way of exercising one’s will 
in the face of adverse circumstances, by managing one’s response to them and 
maybe also by managing the circumstances themselves.”32 If this is right then it 
seems that coping must be possible for all of us, perhaps even no matter what, 
for anyone can exercise their own will and manage their own responses, despite 
one’s relation to the circumstantial elements naturally varying greatly. 33 
“Cannot cope” appears more like a dereliction of duty, an excessive laziness that 
avoids applying willpower and self-control, leaving us with all the emphasis on 
“does not cope”. What it comes down to then is not so much an issue of talent as 
of an effortful desire, a want to feel/do/be otherwise when the world around one 
is not ‘cooperating’. Similarly Seana Shiffrin takes harm as a condition wherein 
a person is subjected to X (whatever that may be) unwillingly, and thus is forced 
to endure said X.34 Although with Shiffrin we have now somewhat unhelpfully 
encountered another troublesome term (“harm”), what is pertinent in her thought 
is its indication of both writers’ emphasis on the centrality of will when it comes 
                                                     
31 J. David Velleman, “The Gift of Life”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 36:3 (2008), 245-266, p. 247; 
emphasis in the original. 
32 ibid., p. 248. 
33 I mean this in general terms; I do understand that it is possible for mentally impaired people or 
people with certain diseases and/or afflictions to have difficulties in these areas. 
34 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of 
Harm”, Legal Theory 5 (1999), 117-148. Shiffrin also has an asymmetry based argument that states 
that the harms of life outweigh its benefits due to the passivity of reception of them, the lack of choice 
involved in being born, and that simply existing does not constitute the kind of “successful effort” 
required for a benefit to be significant. That last point, I think, is particularly open to argument. 
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to suffering. This is intriguing and points to deeper psychological structures and 
models, to awareness and intuitive matters. Let us therefore continue along these 
lines, tabling “harm” terminologically with pain and centering in on life as 
suffering (which includes many instances of pain and harm), and the prospect of 
coping with that. 
Given the facts of life, such as the statistics on deep suffering along with the 
more everyday examples of it that Benatar refers to, I disagree with the buried 
suggestion in Velleman that to experience suffering involves a negligence of 
some sort on the part of the sufferer. If suffering is unavoidable, and I do not 
think that Velleman or even the most advanced Buddhist practitioner35 would 
refute that, then how can it involve a faulting? You might handle your suffering 
much better than I do, and in that be more effective in facing it – facing up to it 
– than me, but we will both suffer and therefore both have to cope in some way: 
this is a matter of better/worse, not succeed/fail (at least not outright). Following 
these conclusions, coping can perhaps broadly be seen as a task within reach but 
one that requires effort, and as such may be done with more or less of said effort 
and result in more or less efficaciousness; and if life itself is (lifelong) coping 
with suffering (pain, harm, etc.) – as we have been considering – then life is 
really a task, a massive undertaking, and, as we have repeatedly pointed out, an 
entirely unchosen one. 
This idea of striving, Velleman remarks, goes all the back to Aristotle, and in 
discussing the Aristotelean standpoint at play he writes that:  
 
To be born as a human being is to be handed a job of work, with a 
promise of great rewards for success, a threat of great harm for refusal, 
and a risk of similar harm for failure. The scene on which a human child 
appears willy-nilly is the scene of a predicament, a challenge with high 
stakes.36 
 
In view of our concerns with Benatar’s work, with the question of coping, with 
pain and suffering, and with life as being either ‘cope-able’ enough or not to 
justify existence, I find a number of problematic elements in this passage, things 
                                                     
35 That is, in its primary function as a means of reducing/avoiding suffering; I do not mean to 
comment here on some of the other ritual and belief based practices that have accrued over the 
centuries to Buddhist philosophy and the lifestyle it promotes. 
36 Velleman, op. cit., p. 250. 
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likely to confuse or blur, and so let us unpack some of the conceptual baggage 
here to see what we might find in regard to our own “Now what?” 
Firstly there is the matter of ‘success’ at the work involved in being human, 
and if we are following the types of eudaimonia oriented ideas that are 
connected with Aristotle’s thinking on the subject (which Velleman refers to) we 
may take such to imply a degree of general welfare, a feeling of fulfillment, 
contentment, satisfaction, wellbeing, that – Velleman reminds us – on the 
Aristotelean worldview is about an entire life and not a moment or moments 
within it.37 If that is our interpretation then the related “great harm for refusal” 
and “risk of similar harm for failure” would be indicative of a person not making 
the necessary efforts in order to ascertain that he himself has attained the 
benefits alluded to. What might this mean in real terms? There is foremost here 
the question of who is judging the success, refusal, and failure. A third party 
could comment on such, but at this point in our study the irrelevancy of that 
must be fairly clear from within the bounds of the personal perspective that we 
have sought to maintain. If you decide that I have failed at the job of being a 
(fulfilled) human then however many others may agree with your assessment 
would make very little difference to my own mentality if I do not follow suit, 
and since we are thinking about a concept as hermeneutically open as “doing the 
work of being a human well (or not)” surely self-reporting would trump all else. 
Straightaway, it seems, we find ourselves right back at the same highlighted 
problems that pertain to devices like the objective list theories argued against 
above. 
Moreover, how might one ‘refuse’ to do the job of being a human? Would 
‘refusal’ here mean only drifting through life, taking the default and easy path at 
each turn, almost a studious avoidance of Heideggerean authenticity? Could a 
response to existence of this nature really be active enough to be considered a 
“refusal” rather than a “failure”? Does “failing” here first require trying, while 
“refusing” does not? Is not “refusing” by and large the acknowledgement and 
rejection of something? Would that not then denote actually saying “no” to being 
and – it would appear to follow – “yes” to death via suicide? A refusal would 
comprehend and then purposely not try; a failure would comprehend, make an 
effort, and come up short. In either case the final labels applied require at the 
minimum an acceptance of validity on the part of the person directly involved in 
                                                     
37 Velleman, op. cit. 
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order to have any significant meaning for the person themselves, and that is of 
utmost importance in determining whether one can cope with the inescapable 
suffering of any human life. We ought to note too that even a self-reported 
‘success’ at the work of being human would not necessarily equal a judgment 
that one was coping (well) with suffering, or that one perforce found life worth 
living; in the absence of concrete, universal, and unarguable criteria that door 
very probably must be left ajar. 
Thus far we have concluded (more or less) that coping appears possible for 
any of us but that it may not come easily, and that its effectiveness will hinge on 
internally applied evaluations. How then, it might be asked, do we tend to rate 
our own lives? Social psychologists Samantha Heintzelman and Laura King 
recently related in a much discussed piece that people all over the world, 
irrespective of age, health, and economic status, said that their own lives are 
meaningful, purposeful, and had direction.38 This would reinforce the findings 
on self-deduced wellbeing that Haidt reported,39 referred to in the section 
immediately above. It points too to the default optimistic valuations that Benatar 
argues are not valid reasons for deciding that life is worthwhile enough to prefer 
it over never living, also discussed in the foregoing.40 For better or worse our 
thoughts have now slid the topic in the direction of meaning, but we may yet 
benefit from extending this slack to our philosophical line since if a life is 
meaningful it must be more amenable to coping than not, and in that 
meaningfulness all encountered suffering too would take its place in the 
backseat of a life and not the driver’s. If I think that my existence has meaning, 
purpose, and direction (or even just meaning) then the presumption that I will 
take my suffering in stride – that I will (successfully) cope – appears warranted, 
and strongly enough so, in my view, that such does not require an independent 
argument for its backing. Things may not be that simple, however. 
Heintzelman and King’s work has been criticized for conflating reported 
meaning with meaning as a concept, and as Austin Jeffrey and Todd Shackelford 
argue this is “only compelling or contestable when misunderstood to imply that 
intrinsic meaning exists.”41 I think that although evidence of reported meaning 
                                                     
38 Samantha J. Heintzelman and Laura A. King, “Life Is Pretty Meaningful”, American Psychologist 
69:6 (2014), 561-574. 
39 Haidt, op. cit. 
40 E.g. Pollyannaism, adaptation to circumstances and the subsequent adjustment of expectations, and 
comparison of oneself with others around one. 
41 Austin John Jeffery and Todd K. Shackelford, “Life Seems Pretty Meaningful”, American 
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is indeed not intrinsic meaning – that is an important distinction – such should 
not therefore lead us to another unwarranted conclusion: that reported meaning 
is without value. My own assessment of my life having a meaning would matter 
to me – perhaps very much – entirely apart from the verifiability or its lack of a 
meaning in/to life on the whole. There need not be any ‘real meaning’ to 
existence, to the universe, to all and sundry in perpetuity throughout eternity, for 
my self-assigned and self-valued meaningfulness to carry sufficient 
psychological weight that it allows, or simply aids, in my coping with the 
suffering that I do and will endure. Jeffrey and Shackelford state that it is only 
the ‘deep meaning’, the ‘ultimate why’ that matters in the question of whether or 
not meaning exists and dismiss individual perceptions of meaning as merely 
derived and inadequate.42 For my own part I am inclined to grant that there very 
likely is no ‘ultimate why’ or underlying reason for existence, or at least not one 
that is accessible to we human animals, and so what is really essential are only 
the so-called derived meanings that we might be able to take, and such are, I 
would think, potent tools in the struggle to cope with life as we find it. On this 
same query of meaning Morioka writes that, “The answer [to having meaning or 
not] ought to be one of two values, a binary yes-or-no, black-or-white, and there 
is no ambiguous gray zone between”.43 This stance, self-applied, admittedly 
says nothing about any ‘why’ to said meaning – whether of the derived or 
intrinsic sort – but it does emphasize that meaning is a non-comparable term that 
can only (rightly, on our argument) be internally applied. If one can say “yes” 
then perhaps one would find oneself able to cope well enough that a further 
ascertainment of human suffering as not necessitating the cessation of human 
existence might be within reach. Such would remain a matter of personal 
perspective and not, by our framework anyway, denote a global judgment, but in 
that its significance for the questioner should not be underestimated. In the end 
all any of us can really do is to guide ourselves through another ‘today’. 
 
5. Conclusion interrupted 
 
We have arrived at very little, certainly nothing that could be called an 
answer to Benatar’s robust and startling challenge. On our analysis we did find 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Psychologist 70:6 (2015), 571, p. 571. 
42 ibid. 
43 Morioka, op. cit., p. 60. 
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some difficulties, or potential problems, in his case for an asymmetry regarding 
being and non-being, as well as in his arguments for what results from the 
vastness of experienced suffering. The conclusion regarding anti-natalism or 
natalism thereby drawn however remains open; but then we intended to leave it 
ambiguous since our quarry has been elsewhere, on the “Now what?”, and that 
is a matter of coping. We did mostly think that coping with life, with its 
suffering, pain, harm, but also – in a certain way – with its transitory joys as well, 
is a possibility for each of us, but that such differs greatly with the individual 
and throughout a lifetime. Coping, based in the personally bound perspective 
one has regarding one’s own existence, was not found to be an issue of success 
or failure but rather of better or worse. It was therefore found that 
self-evaluations and self-reporting on one’s life are paramount, not only 
concerning suffering but also meaning (derivative, not intrinsic). Others may 
judge that we are fooling ourselves, overly positive or negative in our 
assessments, but on our argument that hardly matters, and some ‘self-deception’ 
(i.e. so-called from an outside point of view) might in the end be the key to 
healthy coping. This again does not answer the natalism question, but it does 
move in the direction of a reply to “Now what?” Perhaps that is enough for the 
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